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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ERNEST H. DEAN, as President of the Utah 
STate Senate and as Chairman of the Legislative 
Management Committee of the Forty-First 
Legislature of the State of Utah~ RONALD L. 
RENCHER, as Speaker of the Utah State House of 
Representatives and as Vice-Chairman of the : 
Management Committee of the Forty-First Leg-
islature of the State of Utah~ and W. HUGHES 
BROCKBANK, as a member of the Senate of the 
Forty-First Legislature of the State of Utah, 
Petitioners 
-vs-
CALVIN L. RAMPTON, Governor of the State o-f 
... 
Utah, and as a member of the Board of ExaminerS ·-~'· · 
of the State of Utah~ CLYDE L. MILLER, Liauten~ '.:-
Governor and Secretary of Stat~ of the State l?L J ~ .. 
Utah and as a member of the. Board of Exami~s-~ , ,. ,</':, 
of the State of Utah1 VERNON B. ROMNEY, A"btorlitr~~i::­
General of the State of Utah and as a membe; ~f· 
the Board of Examiners of the State of Ul:~"':Biid ·· ·. 
DAVID S. MONSON AS Auditor of the State of·Utah;;". 
Respondents .. ·.)~·,:~~~. 
- - - - ~ ·~"!.~,;~· .... ~ 
: \·-.~~ ~;~~-
RESPONDENTS ' BRIEF Ilf OPIJOs:I'i~ ~~" •. 
TO PETITION FOR RElmA~. '..-:";;·: .· 
MELVIN E. LESLIE 
Legislative General Counsel 
GEORGE M. MECHAM 
Assistant Legislative General Counsel 
GARY E. ATKIN 
Staff Counsel 
403 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Petitioner.s. 
'· 
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Tl\t'~,i.\ OF CONTE!:rs 
R~IEf IN OPPOSI~TON TO 
F'ETI' CON FOR RE!1EARING. 
POINT I. 
PRIOR APPROVAL BY THE BOARD OF 
EXA':-INERS IS SIMPLY A POLICING TOOL 
TO INSURE UNIFORH APPLICATION OF THE 
TRAVEL EXPENSE POLICY AND IS NOT IN 
ITSELF A CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREHENT • 
POINT II. 
'l'£-iiS COURT, IN ITS ORIGINAL OPINION 
DID NOT ESTABLISH THAT THE BOARD OF EX-
?J~INERS HAS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF 
1-'RIOR APPROVAL ON "PROPOSED BUDGETARY 
E>:?ENDITURES." BUT EVEN IF SUCH A RIGHT 
l''l.ge 
1 
1 
WERE ''ECOGNIZED, IT ~70ULD NOT HAVE THE 
DESTRUCTIVE EFFECT CLAIMED BY PETITIONERS, 2 
CONCLUSION ••..••.•• • • • • • • • • 5 
CASES AND AUTHORITIES CITED 
Wood v. Budge, 13 Utah 2d 359, 374 P.2d 516 (1962) ••. 3, 4 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS CITED 
Article VII, Sec 13, Constitution of Utah. 1 
Section 63-2-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 11 21 3 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
Efu~EST H. DEAN, et al., 
Petitioners, 
Case No. 14518 
-vs-
CALVIN L. RAMPTON, et al., 
Respondents. 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Respondents respectfully submit this brief in opposition 
to Petitioners' petition for rehearing and brief in support 
thereof. 
POINT I. 
PRIOR APPROVAL BY THE BOARD OF 
EXAMINiRS IS SIMPLY A POLICING TOOL 
TO INSURE UNIFOR!-1 APPLICA'riON OF THE 
TRAVEL EXPENSE POLICY AND IS NOT IN 
ITSELF A CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIRE~ffiNT. 
Article VII, Section 13 of the Utah Constitution requires 
that the Board of Examiners "examine all claims against the State 
except salaries or compensation of officers fixed by law." This 
provision does not require that the Board give prior approval of 
all claims. However, in enacting Section 63-2-15, U.C.A. 1953, 
as amended 1969, the legislature recognized that in order to 
effectively control and regulate the travel expenditures of state 
officials in ~ fair and uniform manner, it is necessary for the 
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·oposed tr::·Jel expen. ::•.~.::es prior to their 
l:· ill· , ·ed. Ti"l i.s is mere l_y a ._,ol icing tool -- a means to 
one particular class •f claims in a uniform manner 
among l state agencies. 
~--. petitioners emphasis on I:. ~ approval is misplaced 
""'' ; := effect beg;s the issue. The .loard of Examiners has the 
consL.tutional obligation to examine all claims against the 
state. As noted above, in the travel claims area, prior 
ar · ·oval is a necessary policing tool. In the instant case, how-
ever, members of the legislature not only tried to circumvent 
the prior approval of the Baord of Examiners, but also attempted 
to exempt themselves from the requirement of obtaining any 
a!:~Jroval at all, either prior or subsequent. This is clearly 
violative of the constitutional requirement as it has been re-
peatedly clarified by this court. 
POINT II. 
THIS COURT, IN ITS ORIGINAL OPINION 
DID NOT ESTABLISH THAT THE BOARD OF EX-
At-liNERS HAS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF 
PRIOR APPROVAL ON "PROPOSED BUDGETARY 
EXPENDITURES." BUT EVEN IF SUCH A RIGHT 
WERE RECOGNIZED, IT WOULD NOT HAVE THE 
DESTRUCTIVE EFFECT CLAIMED BY PETITIONERS. 
In its opinion on the original appeal of this case, this 
Court held: 
••. that insofar as subsection (3) of 
Section 63-2-15, U.C.A. 1953, purports to 
exempt memebers of the legislature from 
submitting the claims in question to the 
Board of Examiners it is in conflict with 
Section 13, Article VII, of our Constitu-
tion, and in that particular it is invalid; 
and that as a predicate to the payment of 
any such claims it is necessary that the 
plaintiffs submit them to the Board of Ex-
aminers for approval. (emphasis added). 
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Section 63-2-15{3), referred to above, consists entirely 
of provisions relating to travel claims. The hold'ng of the 
Court is therefore limited specifically to such travel claims. 
There is no language in the holding or elswhere in the opinion 
which indicates that the court contemplated the inclusion of 
all "proposed budgetary expenditures" in this holding. Such 
a broad interpretation as urged by Petitioners is unwarranted. 
Even if the Court had held that the Board of Examiners 
must give prior approval of all "proposed budgetary expenditures," 
such a practice would not "destroy the legislative branch of 
government" as is contended by the Petitioners. It is argued 
that the Court's holding would require that the legislature seek 
the approval of the Baord before passing any bill which appro-
priates money, such being a proposed expenditure of state funds. 
Assuming, arguendo, that this was a required practice, it is 
apparent from the holding of this court in Wood v. Budge, 13 Utah 
2d 359, 374 P.2d 516 {1962), that it would be an exercise in 
futility for the Board to attempt to approve an appropriation 
bill before it is passed. The legislature could simply go ahead 
and pass any bill over the disapproval of the Baord, just as it 
could by special subsequent appropriation in the instant case 
approve a higher travel claim notwithstanding the Board's decision. 
The legislature, the Court said in Wood v. Budge, is the final 
word as to approval of claims against the state: 
The provision of Sec. 13 Art. VII, 
quoted above, that, " ... no claim ... 
shall be passed upon by the Legislature 
without having been considered and acted 
upon by the said Baord of Examiners' plainly 
indicates that the action of the Board was 
not intended to be so final and absolute as 
to preclude other action by the Legislature. 
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t,; 0 can ;'c.rcfFi"e no ot· ~r meaning t:·:an 
t··~ a :the Board t -~ •erformed .ts 
,, .. :·. ,. c · ::amining and act~ ng upon . uch 
c '@ h0 Legislature rna~ then "pass 
~' ~-~-, exercise its judgment, on 
-:- . :~ ;..ake ~: uch action as it deems 
~·. Jpria:~. Entirely .in harmony with 
l" .. :.:; c0nc~ us ion are: our statutory f.Jro-
': • · . .Jn th - ". 1y person who is aggrieved 
b, c'is ,_,,_, · y1a:C of such a claim by the 
Dodrd :.: .. :.~.cl:ners] may appeal therefrom 
to the le. slature"; the prior decisions 
0~ this cc.ct that have touched upon the 
matter; and the practice which has been 
fr)llowed since statehood. (Budge, supra 
''" 362). ---
I~ is therefore clear that nothing in the Court's decision 
in this case is going to result in the destruction of the legis-
lative branch of government. The holding is limited to the 
approval l-:y the Board of Examiners of travel claims submitted 
by th~· legislature, as well as all other state officials, and 
should not be construed in a broader sense. 
The effect of the court's decision in this matter, reduced 
to its essence, is to uphold the constitutional language and a 
long line of previous decisions relating to the Board of Examiners. 
The net result is that Legislators may not be treated differently 
by the Board from the way all other state officials and employees 
are treated with respect to travel expenses. If, however, the 
legislature so chooses, the disapproval of the Board notwith-
standing, to place its members and employees in a special status 
with respect to travel expenses, then it may clearly do so sub-
sequently by a special appropriation paying such claims in any 
amount that the legislature in its sovereign judgment chooses to 
pay. Ultimately the legislature must answer only to the people 
for the expenditure of public funds. 
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C<. <~LUSION 
Pe~it'oners' reques~ :or a rehearing is based upon an 
E· ·• ror, ·ous · terr- ··,,tation of the Court's opinion. Tl·. , Court 
d, 2s not sug _ ·,3t that: the Board of Examiners may usurp legis-
1.:· • · ~ authority by requiring that the ."-:->ard approve all 
p ·.)posed appropriations. The opinion merely recognizes that 
t: Board of Examiners has a constitutional obligation to ex-
amine travel claims; and that, as a practical matter, prior 
appc'-)Val is necessary for the effective control of travel 
expenditures. The legislature can not constitutionally exempt 
itself from these specific requirements. 
For these reasons, Respondents respectfully request that 
the Petition for rehearing be denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PAUL M. TINKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I certify that I delivered two copies of the 
foregoing Brief in Opposition to Petition for 
Rehearing to attorneys for Petitioners, Melvin 
E. Leslie, George M. Mecham, and Gary E. Atkin, 
at their office, 403 State capitol, Salt Lake 
City, this ~day of December, 1976. 
~ (\ •)~~~ 
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